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Over the last decade or so, sociologists and other social scientists concerned with the develop-
ment and application of biomedical research have come to explore the lived realities of
regulation and governance in science. In particular, the instantiation of ethics as a form of
governance within scientific practice – via, for instance, research ethics committees (RECs) –
has been extensively interrogated.2 Social scientists have demonstrated the reciprocally consti-
tutive nature of science and ethics, which renders problematic any assumption that ethics simply
follows (or stifles) science in any straightforward way.3
This chapter draws on and contributes to such discussion through analysing the relationship
between neuroscience (as one case study of scientific work) and research ethics. I draw on data
from six focus groups with scientists in the UK (most of whom worked with human subjects) to
reflect on how ethical questions and the requirements of RECs as a form of regulation are
experienced within (neuro)science. The focus groups were conducted in light of a conceptual
concern with how ‘issues and identities interweave’; i.e. how personal and professional identities
relate to how particular matters of concern are comprehended and engaged with, and how those
engagements themselves participate in the building of identities.4 The specific analysis
1 This chapter revisits and reworks a paper previous published as: M. Pickersgill, ‘The Co-production of Science, Ethics
and Emotion’, (2012) Science, Technology & Human Values, 37(6), 579–603. Data are reproduced by kind permission
of the journal and content used by permission of the publisher, SAGE Publications, Inc.
2 M. M. Easter et al., ‘The Many Meanings of Care in Clinical Research’, (2006) Sociology of Health & Illness, 28(6),
695–712; U. Felt et al., ‘Unruly Ethics: On the Difficulties of a Bottom-up Approach to Ethics in the Field of
Genomics’, (2009) Public Understanding of Science, 18(3), 354–371; A. Hedgecoe, ‘Context, Ethics and
Pharmacogenetics’, (2006) Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 37(3), 566–582;
A. Hedgecoe and P. Martin, ‘The Drugs Don’t Work: Expectations and the Shaping of Pharmacogenetics’, (2003)
Social Studies of Science, 33(3), 327–364; B. Salter ‘Bioethics, Politics and the Moral Economy of Human Embryonic
Stem Cell Science: The Case of the European Union’s Sixth Framework Programme’, (2007) New Genetics & Society,
26(3), 269–288; S. Sperling, ‘Managing Potential Selves: Stem Cells, Immigrants, and German Identity’, (2004) Science
& Public Policy, 31(2), 139–149; M. N. Svendsen and L. Koch, ‘Between Neutrality and Engagement: A Case Study of
Recruitment to Pharmacogenomic Research in Denmark’, (2008) BioSocieties, 3(4), 399–418; S. P. Wainwright et al.,
‘Ethical Boundary-Work in the Embryonic Stem Cell Laboratory’, (2006) Sociology of Health & Illness, 28(6), 732–748.
3 M. Pickersgill, ‘From “Implications” to “Dimensions”: Science, Medicine and Ethics in Society’, (2013) Health Care
Analysis, 21(1), 31–42.
4 C. Waterton and B. Wynne, ‘Can Focus Groups Access Community Views?’ in R. S. Barbour and J. Kitzinger (eds),
Developing Focus Group Research: Politics, Theory and Practice (London: Sage, 1999), pp. 127–143, 142. The method-
ology of these focus groups is more fully described in the following: M. Pickersgill et al., ‘Constituting Neurologic
Subjects: Neuroscience, Subjectivity and the Mundane Significance of the Brain’, (2011) Subjectivity, 4(3), 346–365;
306
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108620024.038
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 02 Aug 2021 at 09:51:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
presented is informed by the work of science and technology studies (STS) scholar Sheila
Jasanoff and other social scientists who have highlighted the intertwinement of knowledge with
social order and practices.5 In what follows, I explore issues that the neuroscientists I spoke with
deem to be raised by their work, and characterise how both informal ideas about ethics and
formal ethical governance (e.g. RECs) are experienced and linked to their research. In doing so,
I demonstrate some of the lived realities of scientists who must necessarily grapple with the
heterogenous forms of health-related research regulation the editors of this volume highlight in
their Introduction, while seeking to conduct research with epistemic and social value.6
31.2 negotiating the ethical dimensions of neuroscience
It is well known that scientists are not lovers of the bureaucracies of research management,
which are commonly taken to include the completion of ethical review forms. This was a topic
of discussion in the focus groups: one scientist, for instance, spoke of the ‘dread’ (M3, Group 5)
felt at the prospect of applying for ethical approvals. Such an idiom will no doubt be familiar to
many lawyers, ethicists and regulatory studies scholars who have engaged with life scientists
about the normative dimensions of their work.
Research governance – specifically, ethical approvals – could, in fact, be seen as having the
potential of hampering science, without necessarily making it more ethical. In one focus group
(Group 1), three postdoctoral neuroscientists discussed the different terms ethics committees had
asked them to use in recruitment materials. One scientist (F3) expressed irritation that another
(F2) was required to alter a recruitment poster, in order that it clearly stated that participants
would receive an ‘inconvenience allowance’ rather than be ‘paid’. The scientists did not think
that this would facilitate recruitment into a study, nor enable it to be undertaken any more
ethically. F3 described how ‘it’s just so hard to get subjects. Also if you need to get subjects from
the general public, you know, you need these tricks’. It was considered that changing recruit-
ment posters would not make the research more ethical – but it might prevent it happening in
the first place.
All that being said, scientists also feel motivated to ensure their research is conducted
‘ethically’. As the power of neuroimaging techniques increases, it is often said that it becomes
all the more crucial for neuroscientists to engage with ethical questions.7 The scientists in my
focus groups shared this sentiment, commonly expressed by senior scientists and ethicists. As one
participant reflected, ‘the ethics and management of brain imaging is really becoming a very key
feature of [. . .] everyday imaging’ (F2, Group 4). Another scientist (F1, Group 2) summarised the
perspectives expressed by all those who participated in the focus groups:
I think the scope of what we can do is broadening all the time and every time you find out
something new, you have to consider the implications on your [research] population.
M. Pickersgill et al., ‘The Changing Brain: Neuroscience and the Enduring Import of Everyday Experience’, (2015),
Public Understanding of Science, 24(7), 878–892; Pickersgill, ‘The Co-production of Science’.
5 S. Jasanoff, S. (ed.) States of Knowledge: The Co-Production of Science and Social Order, Oxford (Routledge, 2004),
pp. 1–12; P. Brodwin, ‘The Coproduction of Moral Discourse in US Community Psychiatry’, (2008) Medical
Anthropology Quarterly, 22(2), 127–147.
6 See Introduction of this volume; A. Ganguli-Mitra, et al., ‘Reconfiguring Social Value in Health Research through the
Lens of Liminality’, (2017) Bioethics, 31(2), 87–96.
7 M. J. Farah, ‘Emerging Ethical Issues in Neuroscience’, (2002) Nature Neuroscience, 5(11), 1123–1129; T. Fuchs,
‘Ethical Issues in Neuroscience’, (2006) Current Opinion in Psychiatry, 19(6), 600–607; J. Illes and É. Racine,
‘Imaging or Imagining? A Neuroethics Challenge Informed by Genetics’, (2005) American Journal of Bioethics, 5(2),
5–18.
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What scientists consider to be sited within the territory of the ‘ethical’ is wide-ranging, under-
scoring the scope of neuroscientific research, and the diverse institutional and personal norms
through which it is shaped and governed. One researcher (F1, Group 2) reflected that ethical
research was not merely that which had been formally warranted as such:
I think when I say you know ‘ethical research’, I don’t mean research passed by an ethics
committee I mean ethical to what I would consider ethical and I couldn’t bring myself to do
anything that I didn’t consider ethical in my job even if it’s been passed by an ethics committee.
I guess researchers should hold themselves to that standard.
Conflicts about what was formally deemed ethical and what scientists felt was ethical were not
altogether rare. In particular, instances of unease and ambivalence around international collab-
oration were reflected upon in some of the focus group discussions. Specifically, these were in
relation to collaboration with nations that the scientists perceived as having relatively lax ethical
governance as compared to the UK. This could leave scientists with a ‘slight uneasy feeling in
your stomach’ (F2, Group 4). Despite my participants constructing some countries as being
more or less ‘ethical’, no focus group participant described any collaborations having collapsed
as a consequence of diverging perspectives on ethical research. However, the possibility that
differences between nations exist, and that these difference could create problems in collabor-
ation, was important to the scientists I spoke with. There was unease attached to collaborating
with a ‘country that doesn’t have the same ethics’ (F2, Group 4). To an extent, then, an
assumption of a shared normative agenda seemed to have significance as an underpinning for
cross-national team science.
The need to ensure confidentiality while also sharing data with colleagues and collaborators
was another source of friction. This was deemed to be a particularly acute issue for neurosci-
ence, since neuroimaging techniques were seen as being able to generate and collect particu-
larly sensitive information about a person (given both the biological salience of the brain and the
role of knowledge about it in crafting identities).8 The need to separate data from anything that
could contribute to identifying the human subject it was obtained from impacted scientists’
relationships with their research. In one focus group (Group 3), M3 pointed out that no longer
were scientists owners of data, but rather, they were responsible chaperones for it.
Fears were expressed in the focus groups that neuroscientific data might inadvertently impact
upon research participants, for instance, affecting their hopes for later life, legal credibility and
insurance premiums. Echoing concerns raised in both ethics and social scientific literatures, my
participants described a wariness about any attempt to predict ‘pathological’ behaviours, since
this could result in the ‘labelling’ (F1, Group 4) or ‘compartmentalising’ (F2, Group 4) of
people.9 As such, these scientists avoided involving themselves in research that necessarily
entailed children, prisoners, or ‘vulnerable people’ (F2, group 4). Intra-institutional tensions
could emerge when colleagues were carrying out studies that the scientists I spoke with did not
regard as ethically acceptable.
Some focus group participants highlighted the hyping of neuroscience, and argued that it was
important to resist this.10 These scientists nevertheless granted the possibility that some of the
8 E. Postan, ‘Defining Ourselves: Personal Bioinformation as a Tool of Narrative Self-conception’, Journal of Bioethical
Inquiry, 13(1), 133–151. See also Postan, Chapter 23 in this volume.
9 Farah, ‘Emerging Ethical Issues’; Illes and Racine, ‘Imaging or Imagining?’; M. Gazzaniga, The Ethical Brain
(Chicago: Dana Press, 2005).
10 Hedgecoe and Martin, ‘The Drugs Don’t Work’, 8.
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wilder promises made about neuroscience (e.g. ‘mind reading’) could one day be realised –
generating ethical problems in the process:
there’s definitely a lot of ethical implications on that in terms of what the average person thinks
that these methods can do and can’t do, and what they actually can do. And if the methods
should get to the point where they could do things like that, to what extent is it going to get used
in what way. (F1, group 1)
Scientists expressed anxiety about ‘develop[ing] your imaging techniques’ but then being unable
to ‘control’ the application of these (F2, Group 4). Yet, not one of my participants stated that
limits should be placed on ‘dangerous’ research. Developments in neuroscience were seen
neither as intrinsically good nor as essentially bad, with nuclear power sometimes invoked as a
similar example of how, to their mind, normativity adheres to deployments of scientific
knowledge rather than its generation. More plainly: the rightness or wrongness of new research
findings were believed to ‘come down to the people who use it’ (F1, Group 1), not to the findings
per se. Procedures almost universally mandated by RECs were invoked as a way of giving licence
to research: ‘a good experiment is a good experiment as long as you’ve got full informed consent,
actually!’ (F1, Group 3). Another said:
I think you can research any question you want. The question is how you design your research,
how ethical is the design in order to answer the question you’re looking at. (F2, Group 2)
Despite refraining from some areas of work themselves, due to the associated social and ethical
implications my participants either found it difficult to think of anything that should not be
researched at all, or asserted that science should not treat anything as ‘off-limits’. One scientist
laughed in mock horror when asked if there were any branches of research that should not be
progressed: ‘Absolutely not!’ (F1 Group 3). This participant described how ‘you just can’t stop
research’, and prohibitions in the UK would simply mean scientists in another country would
conduct those studies instead. In this specific respect, ethical issues seemed to be somewhat
secondary to the socially produced sense of competition that appears to drive forward much
biomedical research.
31.3 incidental findings within neuroimaging research
The challenge of what to do with incidental findings is a significant one for neuroscientists,
and a matter that has exercised ethicists and lawyers (see Postan, Chapter 23 in this
volume).11 They pose a particular problem for scientists undertaking brain imaging.
Incidental findings have been defined as ‘observations of potential clinical significance
unexpectedly discovered in healthy subjects or in patients recruited to brain imaging
research studies and unrelated to the purpose or variables of the study’.12 The possibilities
and management of incidental findings were key issues in the focus group discussions
I convened, with a participant in one group terming them ‘a whole can of worms’
11 T. C. Booth et al., ‘Incidental Findings in “Healthy” Volunteers during Imaging Performed for Research: Current
Legal and Ethical Implications’, (2010) British Journal of Radiology, 83(990), 456–465; N. A. Scott et al., ‘Incidental
Findings in Neuroimaging Research: A Framework for Anticipating the Next Frontier’, (2012) Journal of Empirical
Research on Human Research Ethics, 7(1), 53–57; S. A. Tovino, ‘Incidental Findings; A Common Law Approach’,
(2008) Accountability in Research, 15(4), 242–261.
12 J. Illes et al., ‘Incidental Findings in Brain Imaging Research’, Science, 311(5762), 783–784, 783.
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(F1, Group 3). Another scientist reflected on the issue, and their talk underscores the
affective dimensions of ethically challenging situations:
I remember the first time [I discovered an incidental finding] ’cos we were in the scanner room
we were scanning the child and we see it online basically, that there might be something. It’s a
horrible feeling because you then, you obviously at this point you know the child from a few
hours, since a few hours already, you’ve been working with the child and it’s . . . you have a
personal investment, emotional investment in that already but the important thing is then once
the child comes out of the scanner, you can’t say anything, you can’t let them feel anything, you
know realise anything, so you have to be just really back to normal and pretend there’s nothing
wrong. Same with the parents, you can’t give any kind of indication to them at all until you’ve
got feedback from an expert, which obviously takes so many days, so on the day you can’t let
anything go and no, yeah it was, not a nice experience. (F2, Group 2)
Part of the difficulties inherent in this ethically (and emotionally) fraught area lies in the
relationality between scientist and research subject. Brief yet close relationships between
scientists and those they research are necessary to ensure the smooth running of studies.13
This intimacy, though, makes the management of incidental findings even more challenging.
Further, the impacts of ethically significant issues on teamwork and collaboration are complex;
for instance, what happens if incidental findings are located in the scans of co-workers, rather
than previously unknown research subjects? One respondent described how these would be
‘even more difficult to deal with’ (F1, Group 1). Others reflected that they would refrain from
‘helping out’ by participating in a colleague’s scan when, for instance, refining a protocol. This
was due to the potential of neuroimaging to inadvertently reveal bodily or psychological infor-
mation that they would not want their colleagues to know.
The challenge of incidental findings is one that involves a correspondence between a
particular technical apparatus (i.e. imaging methods that could detect tumours) and an assem-
blage of normative imperatives (which perhaps most notably includes a duty of care towards
research participants). This correspondence is reciprocally impactful: as is well known, tech-
noscientific advances shift the terrain of ethical concern – but so too does the normative shape
the scientific. In the case of incidental findings, for example, scientists increasingly felt obliged
to cost in an (expensive) radiologist into their grants, to inspect each participant’s scan; a scientist
might ‘feel uncomfortable showing anybody their research scan without having had a radiologist
look at it to reassure you it was normal’ (F1, Group 3). Hence, ‘to be truly ethical puts the cost
up’ (F2, Group 4). Not every scientist is able to command such sums from funders, who might
also demand more epistemic bang for the buck when faced with increasingly costly research
proposals. What we can know is intimately linked to what we can, and are willing to, spend. And
if being ‘truly ethical’ indeed ‘puts the cost up’, then what science is sponsored, and who
undertakes this, will be affected.
31.4 normative uncertainties in neuroscience
Scientific research using human and animal subjects in the UK is widely felt to be an amply
regulated domain of work. We might, then, predict that issues like incidental findings can be
13 S. Cohn, ‘Making Objective Facts from Intimate Relations: The Case of Neuroscience and Its Entanglements with
Volunteers’, (2008) History of the Human Sciences, 21(4), 86–103; S. Shostak and M. Waggoner, ‘Narration and
Neuroscience: Encountering the Social on the “Last Frontier of Medicine”’, in M. D. Pickersgill and I. van Keulen,
(eds), Sociological Reflections on the Neurosciences (Bingley: Emerald, 2011), pp. 51–74.
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rendered less challenging to deal with through recourse to governance frameworks. Those
neuroscientists who exclusively researched animals indeed regarded the parameters and proced-
ures defining what was acceptable and legal in their work to be reasonable and clear. In fact,
strict regulation was described as enjoining self-reflection about whether the science they were
undertaking was ‘worth doing’ (F1, Group 6). This was not, however, the case for my participants
working with humans. Rather, they regarded regulation in general as complicated, as well as
vague: in the words of two respondents, ‘too broad’ and ‘open to interpretation’ (F1, Group 2),
and ‘a bit woolly’ and ‘ambiguous’ (F2, group 2). Take, for instance, the Data Protection Act: in
one focus group (Group 3) a participant (F1) noted that a given university would ‘take their own
view’ about what was required by the Act, with different departments and laboratories in turn
developing further – potentially diverging – interpretations.
Within the (neuro)sciences, procedural ambiguity can exist in relation to what scientists,
practically, should do – and how ethically valorous it is to do so. Normative uncertainty can be
complicated further by regulatory multiplicity. The participants of one focus group, for example,
told me about three distinct yet ostensibly nested ethical jurisdictions they inhabited: their home
department of psychology, their university medical school and their local National Health
Service Research Ethics Committee (NHS REC). The scientists I spoke with understood these
to have different purviews, with different procedural requirements for research, and different
perspectives on the proper way enactment of ethical practices, such as obtaining informed
consent in human subjects research.
Given such normative uncertainty, scientists often developed what we might term ‘ethical
workarounds’. By this, I mean that they sought to navigate situations where they were unsure of
what, technically, was the ‘right’ thing to do by establishing their own individual and community
norms for the ethical conduct of research, which might only be loosely connected to formal
requirements. In sum, they worked around uncertainty by developing their own default practices
that gave them some sense of surety. One participant (F1, Group 2) described this in relation to
drawing blood from people who took part in her research. To her mind, this should be
attempted only twice before being abandoned. She asserted that this was not formally required
by any research regulation, but instead was an informal standard to which she and colleagues
nevertheless adhered.
In the same focus group discussion, another scientist articulated a version of regulatory
underdetermination to describe the limits of governance:
not every little detail can be written down in the ethics and a lot of it is in terms of if you’re a
researcher you have to you knowmake your mind up in terms of the ethical procedures you have to
adhere to yourself andwhatwould youwant to be done to yourself or not to be done . . . (F2, Group 2)
Incidental findings were a key example of normative uncertainty and the ethical workarounds
that resulted from this. Although ‘not every little detail can be written down’, specificity in
guidelines can be regarded as a virtue in research that is seen to have considerable ethical
significance, and where notable variations in practice were known to exist. The scientist quoted
above also discussed how practical and ethical decisions must be made as a result of the
detection of clinically relevant incidental findings, but that their precise nature was uncertain:
scientists were ‘struggling’ due to being ‘unsure’ what the correct course of action should be.
Hence, ‘proper guidelines’ were invoked as potentially useful, but these were seemingly con-
sidered to be hard to come by.
The irritations stimulated by a perceived lack of clarity on the ethically and/or legally right
way to proceed are similarly apparent in the response of this scientist to a question about her
Ethics, Governance and Scientific Practice 311
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108620024.038
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. University of Edinburgh, on 02 Aug 2021 at 09:51:15, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
feelings upon discovering, for the first time, a clinically relevant incidental finding in the course
of her neuroimaging work:
It was unnerving! And also because it was the first time I wasn’t really sure how to deal with it all,
so I had to go back in the, see my supervisor and talk to them about it and, try to find out how
exactly we’re dealing now with this issue because I wasn’t aware of the exact clear guidelines.
(F2, Group 2)
Different scientists and different institutions were reported to have ‘all got a different way of
handling’ (F2, Group 4) the challenge of incidental findings. Institutional diversity was
foregrounded, such as in the comments of F1 (Group 1). She described how when working
at one US university ‘there was always a doctor that had to read the scans so it was just
required’. She emphasised how there was no decision-making around this on behalf of the
scientist or the research participant: it was simply a requirement. On the other hand, at a
different university this was not the case – no doctor was on call to assess neuroimages for
incidental findings.
An exchange between two researchers (F1 and F2, Group 2) also illustrates the problems of
procedural diversity. Based in the same university but in different departments, they discussed
how the complexities of managing incidental findings was related, in part, to practices of
informed consent. Too lengthy a dialogue to fully reproduce here, two key features stood out.
First, differences existed in whether the study team would, in practice, inform a research
subject’s physician in the event of an individual finding: in F2’s case, it was routine for the
physician to be contacted, but F1’s participants could opt out of this. However, obtaining
physician contact details was itself a tricky undertaking:
we don’t have the details of the GP so if we found something we would have to contact them
[the participant] and we’d have to ask them for the GP contact and in that case they could say
no, we don’t want to, so it’s up to them to decide really, but we can’t actually say anything
directly to them what we’ve found or what we think there might be because we don’t know, ’cos
the GP then will have to send them to proper scans to determine the exact problem, ’cos our
scans are obviously not designed for any kind of medical diagnosis are they? So I suppose they’ve
still got the option to say no. (F2, Group 2)
It is also worth noting at this point the lack of certitude of the scientists I spoke with about where
directives around ethical practice came from, and what regulatory force these had. F1 (Group 1)
and F2 (Group 2) above, for instance, spoke about how certain processes were ‘just required’ or
how they ‘have to’ do particular things to be ‘ethical’. This underscores the proliferation and
heterogeneity of regulation the editors of this volume note in their Introduction, and the
challenges of comprehending and negotiating it in practice by busy and already
stretched professionals.
31.5 discussion
The ethical aspects of science often require discursive and institutional work to become
recognised as such, and managed thereafter. In other words, for an issue to be regarded as
specifically ethical, scientists and universities need to, in some sense, agree that it is; matters that
ethicists, for instance, might take almost for granted as being intrinsically normative can often
escape the attention of scientists themselves. After an issue has been characterised by researchers
as ethical, addressing it can necessitate bureaucratic innovation, and the reorganisation of work
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practices (including new roles and changing responsibilities). Scientists are not always satisfied
with the extent to which they are able, and enabled, to make these changes. The ethics of
neuroscience, and the everyday conversations and practices that come into play to deal with
them, can also have epistemic effects: ethical issues can and do shape scientists relationships
with the work, research participants, and processes of knowledge-production itself.
The scientists I spoke with listed a range of issues as having ethical significance, to varying
degrees. Key among these were incidental findings. The scientists also engaged in what
sociologist Steven Wainwright and colleagues call ‘ethical boundary work’; i.e. they some-
times erected boundaries between scientific matters and normative concerns, but also
collapsed these when equating good science with ethical science.14 This has the effect of
enabling scientists to present research they hold in high regard as being normatively
valorous, while also bracketing off ethical questions they consider too administratively or
philosophical challenging to deal with as being insufficiently salient to science itself to
necessitate sustained engagement.
Still, though, ethics is part and parcel of scientific work and of being a scientist. Normative
reflection is, to varying degrees, embedded within the practices of researchers, and can surface
not only in focus group discussions but also in corridor talk and coffee room chats. This is, in
part, a consequence of the considerable health-related research regulation to which scientists are
subject. It is also a consequence of the fact that scientists are moral agents: people who live and
act in a world with other persons, and who have an everyday sense of right and wrong. This sense
is inevitably and essentially context-dependent, and it inflects their scientific practice and will be
contoured in turn by this. It is these interpretations of regulation in conjunction with the
mundane normativity of daily life that intertwine to constitute scientists’ ethical actions within
the laboratory and beyond, and in particular that cultivate their ethical workarounds in condi-
tions of uncertainty.
31.6 conclusion
In this chapter I have summarised and discussed data regarding how neuroscientists construct
and regard the ethical dimensions of their work, and reflected on how they negotiate health-
related research regulation in practice. Where does this leave regulators? For a start, we need
more sustained, empirical studies of how scientists comprehend and negotiate the ethical
dimensions of their research in actual scientific work, in order to ground the development
and enforcement of regulation.15 What is already apparent, however, is that any regulation that
demands actions that require sharp changes in practice, to no clear benefit to research partici-
pants, scientists, or wider society, is unlikely to invite adherence. Nor are frameworks that place
demands on scientists to act in ways they consider unethical, or which place unrealistic burdens
(e.g. liaising with GPs without the knowledge of research participants) on scientists that leave
them anxious and afraid that they are, for instance, ‘breaking the law’ when failing to act in a
practically unfeasible way.
It is important to recognise that scientists bring to bear their everyday ethical expertise to their
research, and it is vital that this is worked with rather than ridden over. At the same time, it takes
14 Wainwright et al., ‘Ethical Boundary-Work’.
15 M. Pickersgill et al., ‘Biomedicine, Self and Society: An Agenda for Collaboration and Engagement’, (2019)Wellcome
Open Research, 4(9).
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a particular kind of scientist to call into question the ethical basis of their research or that of close
colleagues, not least given an impulse to conflate good science with ethical science.
Consequently, developing regulation in close collaboration with scientists also needs the
considered input of critical friends to both regulators and to life scientists (including but not
limited to social scientific observers of the life sciences). This would help mitigate the possibility
of the inadvertent reworking or even subverting of regulation designed to protect human
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